Program

Causes, Norms, and Decisions Workshop,
August 15 – 17, 2018

Organization: Institute of Philosophy, Leibniz Universität Hannover (Hannover)

Local organizer: Enno Fischer, Mathias Frisch, and Sebastian Krug

Sponsored by: DFG, German Research Foundation

Location: Institute of Philosophy (Room B313), Leibniz Universität Hannover, Im Moore 21 (Hinterhaus), 30167 Hannover, Germany

 

Preliminary program updated August 14, 2018

(available as a pdf)

 

Wednesday, August 15

9:30-10:00 Registration and Welcome

10:00-11:15 Christopher Hitchcock (Caltech): Actual Causation and Norms
Commentator: Alison Fernandes (Warwick University): Causation and Decision Making

Coffee break until 11:30

11:30-12:30 Enno Fischer (Leibniz Universität Hannover): Causes, Interventions and Responsibility

Lunch break until 2:00

2:00-3:00 Georgie Statham (Van Leer Jerusalem Institute): How normative factors (legitimately) influence our type causal claims

3:00-4:00 Huw Price (University of Cambridge): Causation, Chance, and Dummett’s Dilemma

 

 

Thursday, August 16

9:00-10:00 Christopher Hitchcock (Caltech): Causal Models of Deliberating Agents

10:00-11:00 Reuben Stern (LMU Munich): An Interventionist’s Guide to Exotic Choice

Coffee break until 11:30

11:30-12:30 Jon Bebb (University of Manchester): Against the Heuristics- and Biases Strategy

Lunch break until 2:00

2:00-3:00 Weyma Lübbe (Universität Regensburg): Action Theory and Decision Theory on “Causing” Lives and Deaths

Coffee break until 3:30

3:30-4:30 Sander Beckers (Utrecht University): Causation and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities

7:00 Conference Dinner

 

Friday, August 17

9:00-10:00 Thomas Blanchard (Illinois Wesleyan University): Interventionist Decision Theory and Determinism

10:00-11:00 York Hagmeyer (Universität Göttingen): Do people consider causal expected utilities in decision making? – Findings from cognitive psychological research

Coffee break until 11:30

11:30-12:30 Kate Vredenburgh (Harvard University): The explanatory power of classical rational choice theory: saved by interventionism?